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CONCLUSION
It is little wonder that rape is one of the least-re-
ported crimes. Perhaps it is the only crime in
which the victim becomes the accused and, in real-
ity, it is she who must prove her good reputation, her
mental soundness, and her impeccable propriety.
—Freda Adler1
INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, an unlikely coalition of feminists, victim’s
rights advocates, and conservative “law and order” groups came to-
gether with a single common goal: to reform the defendant-friendly
rape laws in the United States.2 This coalition was very successful in
altering rape statutes across the nation, and by the mid-1980s nearly
every state had enacted rape shield laws that made evidence of a vic-
tim’s prior sexual history inadmissible.3 Furthermore, many states
1. FREDA ADLER, SISTERS IN CRIME: THE RISE OF THE NEW FEMALE CRIMINAL 215
(1975).
2. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of
Rape Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554,
554 (1993).
3. Julie Horney & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change in Six
Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 119 (1991).
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had expanded the number and scope of statutes available to prose-
cutors in sexual assault cases, and many states had removed the so-
called “resistance requirement”—the requirement that a rape victim
provide physical resistance to her attacker during the rape in order
to be able to press charges.4
While the changes affected by rape reforms of the 1970s and
1980s were vast and nearly universal, many modern rape experts be-
lieve that the reforms did not go far enough.5 Several scholarly works
have argued that the empirical impact of rape law reforms has been
quite limited.6 There is a widely held belief amongst rape scholars that
the reformers should have removed the element of force: the require-
ment that an attacker must have used physical force or the threat
of physical force to commit the rape in order for that attacker to be
convicted.7 Despite this scholarly consensus, a majority of states still
retain force requirements in their rape statutes involving penetration.8
Some states, however, such as Georgia, Florida, and Colorado, have
completely removed the force requirement from their rape statutes.9
This Note will compare rape statistics in Massachusetts, a juris-
diction whose rape statute contains a heavily entrenched force ele-
ment, to those in Colorado, a jurisdiction whose rape statute does not
contain a force element. In comparing these statistics, this Note will
argue that there is some empirical evidence suggesting that remov-
ing the force requirement from Colorado’s rape statutes may have
affected its rape reporting rate, both in comparison to the rape report-
ing rate of Massachusetts and the nation as a whole. This Note will
further examine a number of potential reasons for the differences be-
tween the rape reporting rates of Colorado and Massachusetts and
will hypothesize that Colorado’s removal of the force requirement from
its rape statute may have had a practical effect.
I. BACKGROUND OF RAPE LAW REFORM IN AMERICA
Historically, rape cases in America have been handled in a
defendant-friendly fashion because of a lingering idea that rape is
4. Id. at 118-19.
5. See id. at 120.
6. Id. at 129–51; Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 573–74; David P. Bryden
& Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1194, 1228 (1997).
7. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320–22 (2000)
(“Virtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as
an element of rape.”).
8. John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-
Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1084–86 (2011).
9. Id. at 1084, 1084 n.12.
2015] DOES REMOVING THE FORCE ELEMENT MATTER? 769
a crime particularly susceptible to false accusations.10 The tradi-
tional elements of rape as inherited from English common law were
(1) carnal knowledge of a woman; (2) not one’s wife; (3) by force; and
(4) against her will.11 These elements were construed particularly
harshly against victims accusing their attackers of rape, in part due
to an attitude put into words perfectly by Sir Matthew Hale, Lord
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench: “ ‘rape is an accusation easy to be
made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party
accused though ever so innocent.’ ”12
Many pre-reform rape trials tended to focus on the sexual history
and moral characteristics of the victim rather than the alleged actions
of the accused, in large part due to widespread male skepticism about
the veracity of rape accusations and the potential for false convic-
tions.13 For this reason, there was also a “corroboration requirement,”
prohibiting a rape conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of the
victim.14 Also, because intercourse had to be against the victim’s will
to classify as rape, there was a “resistance requirement” read into rape
cases: a victim was required to physically resist her attacker to the “ut-
most” to prove that the intercourse was, in fact, against her will.15
In the 1970s and 1980s, several disparate groups came together
to try to reformulate rape laws in America. Feminists, victims’ advo-
cacy groups, and conservative “law and order” groups may have had
little in common, but each had a vested interest in making Ameri-
can rape laws tougher and less defendant-friendly.16
Feminist and victims’ advocacy groups resented inquiries into
a victim’s sexual history, because such inquiries tended to turn rape
trials into embarrassing evaluations of the victim’s conformation with
societal expectations of chastity rather than legitimate inquiries into
the guilt or innocence of the accused.17 Feminists found that the resis-
tance requirement cast all women into one of two distinct subservi-
ent gender roles in which they were either forbidden from exercising
any sexual agency or were classified as sex objects with no right to
resist the sexual advances of men.18 Feminists also disapproved of the
corroboration requirement, because it reinforced the stereotype of
10. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 558.
11. Horney & Spohn, supra note 3, at 118.
12. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 558 (quoting MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 634–35 (1847)).
13. J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the
Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 546–47 (1980).
14. Horney & Spohn, supra note 3, at 119.
15. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581,
588–89 (2009).
16. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 554.
17. Gruber, supra note 15, at 587–93.
18. Id. at 588–89.
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the “lying vindictive shrew,” a jilted girlfriend or lover who used false
allegations of rape to punish a man for leaving her or wronging her.19
Meanwhile, in the 1970s and 1980s, conservative groups were
upset with American rape laws based on a number of well-known rape
cases with seemingly unjust outcomes favoring defendants.20 Cases
such as North Carolina v. Alston,21 Rusk v. Maryland,22 and Illinois v.
Warren23 garnered much scholarly attention and underscored just how
inconsistent and defendant-friendly American rape laws could be.24
Beginning in the mid-1970s, states began to change their rape
statutes to accommodate the rights of rape victims and address some
of the issues raised by the coalition of feminist groups, victims’ rights
advocacy groups, and conservative groups.25 In 1974, Michigan became
the first state to enact wholesale changes to its rape statutes.26 Michi-
gan enacted what has become known as a “rape shield” into its Sexual
Conduct Statute, which completely prohibited the admissibility at trial
of evidence of the victim’s sexual history with third parties.27 Michi-
gan’s rape law reform catalyzed the national rape reform process and
by the mid-1980s, every state had reformed its rape statutes in one
way or another.28 Some of the most common reforms included broad-
ening the definition of rape, removal of the resistance and corrobo-
ration requirements, and installation of rape shield laws.29
Despite this national drive to reform rape laws, a majority of
states have not removed the force requirement from their rape statutes
in rapes involving penetration.30 This is problematic because most
rape scholars believe that the force requirement should be removed
19. Id. at 589–90.
20. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 555.
21. 312 S.E.2d 470, 472–73, 476 (N.C. 1984) (ruling that a woman who was bullied into
accompanying her ex-boyfriend to a friend’s house and having sex had not been raped,
despite the fact that she had told the ex-boyfriend “no . . . I wasn’t going to bed with him,”
and she cried during the intercourse).
22. 406 A.2d 624, 625–26, 628 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (Md.
1981) (holding that a woman had not been raped, despite the fact that a woman who was
giving an acquaintance a ride home was essentially forced into the acquaintance’s apart-
ment because he took her car keys and refused to return them, and then bullied into inter-
course by general threatening behavior).
23. 446 N.E.2d 591, 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (reversing a rape conviction, ruling the
victim’s failure to physically resist her attacker conveyed the impression of consent regard-
less of her mental state).
24. See Bryden, supra note 7, at 350–51, 361–62.
25. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 559.
26. Id.
27. Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 170, 172 (1980).
28. Stacy Futter & Walter R. Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape
Case Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 72–73 (2001).
29. Horney & Spohn, supra note 3, at 118.
30. Decker & Baroni, supra note 8, at 1084–85; Bienen, supra note 27, at 171–72.
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in the same way the resistance and corroboration requirements were
removed.31 It is also problematic because although a vast majority
of states have abolished the resistance requirement, requiring a show-
ing of force essentially maintains the resistance requirement in ac-
quaintance rape cases.32 Some states, such as Georgia, Florida, and
Colorado have removed the force element from their rape statutes.33
Other states, including New Jersey, have constructively removed the
force requirement through judicial action by ruling that the force
used to achieve penetration is enough to provide the force required by
statute.34 In most jurisdictions in America, however, the force re-
quirement is alive and well.35
II. RAPE LAWS IN MASSACHUSETTS AND COLORADO
This Note focuses on the empirical impact of the rape statues
in Massachusetts and Colorado, and specifically whether the removal
of the force requirement from the states’ respective rape statutes has
made a tangible, statistical difference. Massachusetts was selected
because it maintains a force requirement in its rape statute,36 and
because recent cases such as Suliveres v. Commonwealth37 have vigor-
ously upheld the force standard. Colorado was selected because its
rape statute is one of the clearest examples of a statute that is consent-
based and contains no overt or hidden force requirement.38 Before
examining the empirical statistics, this Note will examine the intrica-
cies of each state’s rape statutes and evaluate what legal factors have
contributed to differences in statistics gathered in each jurisdiction.
A. Rape Law in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts rape statute reads, in relevant part, “Whoever
has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a person,
and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or
31. Bryden, supra note 7, at 322.
32. Id. at 356 (“In most cases involving acquaintances the force element is, in effect,
a resistance requirement. This is because an unarmed acquaintance rapist typically does
not employ force unless he meets resistance. If the woman does not resist, he will simply
have intercourse with her, and the great majority of courts do not regard the sexual act
itself as inherently forcible.”).
33. Decker & Baroni, supra note 8, at 1084, 1084 n.12.
34. See Rape Law—Lack of Affirmative and Freely-Given Permission—New Jersey
Supreme Court Holds That Lack of Consent Constitutes “Physical Force”, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 969, 969 (1993) [hereinafter Rape Law].
35. Decker & Baroni, supra note 8, at 1084–85.
36. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 1998).
37. 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007).
38. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2013).
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compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment . . . .”39 The statute as it is currently writ-
ten was drafted in 1974 and amended in minor fashion in 1980 and
1998.40 However, neither the 1980 nor the 1998 revision made any
changes to the language surrounding the force requirement; the 1980
revision subdivided rape cases into those involving serious physical
injury to the victim and those not involving such injury (while main-
taining the force standard), and the 1998 revision added increased
penalties for repeat offenders and offenders using firearms.41
The Massachusetts rape statute includes both force (“by force”)
and consent (“against his will”) elements. The landmark case of
Suliveres v. Commonwealth recently upheld the force requirement
in Massachusetts in a fashion similar to how the force requirement
has historically been applied.42 In that case, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court upheld a 1959 ruling that sexual intercourse procured
by means of fraud is not considered rape because it is lacking the
extrinsic force element required by statute.43 The court maintained
the strict nature of the force requirement in the Massachusetts rape
statute, and denied the prosecution’s request to alter Massachusetts’s
rape statute in the way New Jersey had previously altered its statute,
by allowing the force required to achieve penetration to fulfill the
force requirement.44 This decision was instrumental in maintaining
the “purity” of the force requirement in Massachusetts’s statute.45
Other cases in Massachusetts have also upheld the force require-
ment in that state’s rape statutes. In Commonwealth v. Goldenberg,46
the 1959 case affirmed by Suliveres, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court held that sexual intercourse obtained by fraud was not rape per
se, because in order for sexual intercourse to be considered rape, the
defendant must have used force or the threat of force.47 Similarly, in
Commonwealth v. Lopez,48 a 2001 Massachusetts Supreme Court
case, the court held that in Massachusetts, “unless the putative victim
has been rendered incapable of consent, the prosecution must prove
that the defendant compelled the victim’s submission by use of
physical force; nonphysical, constructive force; or threat of force.” 49
39. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (LexisNexis 1998) (emphasis added).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Suliveres, 865 N.E.2d 1086, 1091 (Mass. 2007).
43. Id. at 1089–91.
44. Id. at 1089–90 (“[W]e are not free, any more than we were in the Goldenberg case,
to adopt the Commonwealth’s proposed interpretation.”).
45. See id. at 1089.
46. 155 N.E.2d 187, 190–92 (Mass. 1959).
47. Id. at 191–92.
48. 745 N.E.2d 961 (Mass. 2001).
49. Id. at 966.
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Numerous other Massachusetts rape cases have similarly upheld
the force requirement in Massachusetts,50 making the state a prime
example of a jurisdiction with a force requirement.
B. Rape Law in Colorado
The Colorado sexual assault statute reads, in relevant part,
“(1) Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual pene-
tration on a victim commits sexual assault if: (a) The actor causes
submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reason-
ably calculated to cause submission against the victim’s will. . . .” 51
The statute was enacted in its modern form in 1973, and the force
requirement for second-degree assault was removed by 1985.52 The
force requirement was abandoned completely by 2000.53
The Colorado rape statute has no force requirement, and is com-
pletely consent-based. According to the statute, a rape occurs if the
perpetrator has intercourse with the victim “against the victim’s
will.” 54 The Colorado criminal code defines consent as, “ ‘cooperation
in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will and with knowl-
edge of the nature of the act,’ ” 55 and provides examples of acts that
do not constitute consent, such as the status of currently or formerly
being in a relationship with a person, or submitting under the influ-
ence of fear.56 Colorado’s rape statute has absolutely no force require-
ment, unlike some states that do not have force requirements in the
language of their rape tatutes but have implicit force requirements
built into their statutes via language in the definitional sections.57
Such states require some showing of force by the attacker or resis-
tance by the victim in order for their statutes to apply.58
Case law in Colorado confirms that force has not been a required
element in convicting defendants of rape. For example, in People v.
Santana-Medrano,59 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that while the
50. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 677–78 (Mass. 2001); Common-
wealth v. Caracciola, 569 N.E.2d 774, 779 (Mass. 1991); Commonwealth v. Oquendo, 982
N.E.2d 538, 542, 544 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013); Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 897 N.E.2d
105, 112, 114 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008); Commonwealth v. Tatro, 676 N.E.2d 843, 846 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1997).
51. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2013).
52. See Apodaca v. People, 712 P.2d 467, 472 n.7 (Colo. 1985).
53. 2000 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 171 (H.B. 00-1107) (WEST).
54. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2013).
55. Decker & Baroni, supra note 8, at 1088 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-401
(2003)).
56. Id. at 1088–89.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1088–90.
59. 165 P.3d 804, 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
774 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 21:767
level of force used in a rape could affect which degree of felony could be
charged, the element of force was not a necessary component of the
state’s general sexual assault statute.60 Similarly, in People v.
Lehmkul61 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that while the use of
a deadly weapon in the course of a rape would automatically show that
the intercourse was against the victim’s will, there were “different
methods by which submission of the victim is obtained,” including non-
forcible ones.62 The only difference the court noted was that non-
forcible means of obtaining the victim’s submission might lead to a
lesser degree of felony charged.63 Colorado case law shows that
while the use of force might affect the sentencing of a person con-
victed of rape, there is no force requirement in Colorado’s sexual
assault statute.
III. EMPIRICAL RAPE STATISTICS FROM
MASSACHUSETTS AND COLORADO
According to the 1996 National Violence Against Women Survey
(NVAWS), 17.6 percent of American women and 3 percent of American
men said they had been the victims of a completed or attempted rape.64
However, according to the survey, only 19.1 percent of women and 12.9
percent of men reported these rapes to the authorities, and only 43.3
percent of the reported rapes led to the arrest or detention of the ac-
cused rapist.65 Furthermore, according to the survey, only 37 percent
of the rapes against women that were reported to the police resulted
in criminal prosecution, and those prosecutions led to only 46.2 percent
of the prosecuted rapists being convicted of a crime.66 This extremely
high rate of victimization and low rate of conviction suggests that
America has an as-of-yet unsolved problem on its hands.
Very little empirical analysis has been conducted on rape rates
and the effect of rape statutes,67 in part because the rape statistics
available to researchers are notoriously untrustworthy.68 Detailed sta-
tistics on rape reporting and arrest rates are widely available, but
they do not show how many rapes actually occur, can vary depending
60. Id. at 806.
61. 117 P.3d 98 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
62. Id. at 106.
63. Id.
64. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMI-
ZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 7 (Jan. 2006)
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc
/UBG4-WKK5, [hereinafter NIJ Report].
65. Id. at 33.
66. Id.
67. Horney & Spohn, supra note 3, at 121; Futter & Mebane, supra note 28, at 83–84.
68. Futter & Mebane, supra note 28, at 86.
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on what body collected them, and do not include conviction rates.69
The FBI releases an annual table containing estimates of how many
actual rapes there are per year in individual regions of the United
States,70 but the posted methodology of these tables shows that they
are little more than dead-reckoning.71 Furthermore, there are a wide
variety of estimations of how many rapes go unreported.72 For exam-
ple, the Rape Abuse & Incest National Network claims 68 percent of
sexual assaults go unreported,73 the NVAWS suggested that just over
80 percent of rapes of women go unreported,74 and West Virginia Uni-
versity estimates that 50 to 90 percent of rapes go unreported.75
This Note focuses on the empirical differences between the rape
statistics in Massachusetts and those in Colorado and what implica-
tions those statistics may have on whether the removal of the force
requirement has made a tangible difference. Much of the focus of the
statistical analysis of this Note will be on reporting rates. This Note
will take into account both current and historical rape reporting rates
to see if removing the force requirement is a useful tool for prosecu-
tors, and whether it has made a difference historically. This Note will
also estimate how many rapes were committed in each jurisdiction in
order to see if the removal of the force requirement has had an effect
on how law enforcement handles rape cases and how the public views
rape and rape reporting.
A. Massachusetts Rape Statistics
Below are a chart and a graph to illustrate the statistics that are
referenced in this section.
69. Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, available at http://www
.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr ( last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/BK39-JQK8.
70. Violent Crime, Table 4, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2012), available at http:
//www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables
/4tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_4_crime_in_the_united_states_by_region_geographic
_division_and_state_2011-2012.xls, archived at http://perma.cc/J2KD-HWF9.
71. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2012 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s
/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/4tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_4_crime_in_the
_united_states_by_region_geographic_division_and_state_2011-2012.xls, archived at http://
perma.cc/VP9U-7E28.
72. See infra notes 73–75.
73. Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, http://www.rainn.org/statistics
(last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/U7CH-W727.
74. NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 34. Number calculated by author based on percentage
of rapes that were reported.
75. Rape Myths and Facts, W. VA. UNIV., http://well.wvu.edu/articles/rape_myths
_and_facts (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/89VP-GYED.
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MASSACHUSETTS RAPE STATISTICS TABLE76
Year
MA Total
Reported
Rapes
MA Rape Report
Rate (per 100,000
population)
USA Total
Reported
Rapes
USA Rape
Report Rate
(per 100,000
population)
1960 249 4.8 17190 9.6
1961 291 5.6 17220 9.4
1962 256 5 17550 9.4
1963 236 4.5 17650 9.4
1964 320 6 21420 11.2
1965 290 5.4 23410 12.1
1966 344 6.4 25820 13.2
1967 411 7.6 27620 14
1968 518 9.5 31670 15.9
1969 592 10.8 37170 18.5
1970 684 12 37990 18.7
1971 715 12.4 42260 20.5
1972 784 13.5 46850 22.5
1973 949 16.3 51400 24.5
1974 907 15.6 55400 26.2
1975 1121 19.2 56090 26.3
1976 1028 17.7 57080 26.6
1977 1203 20.8 63500 29.4
1978 1307 22.6 67610 31
1979 1428 24.8 76390 34.7
1980 1562 27.3 82990 36.8
1981 1580 27.4 82500 36
1982 1464 25.3 78770 34
1983 1495 25.9 78920 33.7
1984 1627 28.1 84230 35.7
1985 1734 29.8 88670 37.1
1986 1731 29.7 91459 38.1
1987 1868 31.9 91110 37.4
1988 1876 32 92490 37.6
1989 1881 31.8 94500 38.1
1990 2030 33.7 102560 41.2
76. Information for this table and the graph below comes from Massachusetts Crime
Rates 1960–2012, DISASTER CTR. (Nov. 24, 2013 10:50 AM), http://www.disastercenter
.com/crime/macrime.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/WSS5-WMAQ, and from United
States Crime Rates 1960–2012, DISASTER CTR., available at http://www.disastercenter
.com/crime/uscrime.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F4TH
-NF4D. As the data on the Disaster Center website is updated periodically, these numbers
are accurate as of February 19, 2015, but may have changed slightly by the date of pub-
lication of this Note.
2015] DOES REMOVING THE FORCE ELEMENT MATTER? 777
Year
MA Total
Reported
Rapes
MA Rape Report
Rate (per 100,000
population)
USA Total
Reported
Rapes
USA Rape
Report Rate
(per 100,000
population)
1991 1926 32.1 106590 42.3
1992 2166 36.1 109060 42.8
1993 2006 33.4 106010 41.1
1994 1825 30.2 102220 39.3
1995 1759 29 97470 37.1
1996 1767 29 96250 36.3
1997 1647 26.9 96153 35.9
1998 1687 27.4 93103 34.4
1999 1663 26.9 89411 32.8
2000 1696 26.7 90178 32
2001 1856 29 90863 31.8
2002 1777 27.7 95235 33.1
2003 1848 28.8 93883 32.3
2004 1794 28 95089 32.4
2005 1751 27.2 94347 31.8
2006 1742 27.1 92757 30.9
2007 1634 25.3 90427 30
2008 1744 26.7 90479 29.8
2009 1734 26.3 89241 29.1
2010 1784 27.2 85593 27.7
2011 1654 25 84175 27
2012 1650 24.8 85141 26.9
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In 2012, Massachusetts had a population of 6,645,303.77 During
that time, approximately 1,650 rapes were reported to police, compris-
ing a reported rape rate of 24.8 rapes per 100,000 population.78 Accord-
ing to the reporting rate estimates above,79 this could mean that there
were anywhere from 3,300 to 16,500 actual rapes committed in Massa-
chusetts in 2012. Because the NVAWS tends to be one of the most
well-respected statistical compilations,80 this Note will utilize the
roughly 20 percent reporting standard81 and approximate that 8,250
rapes actually occurred in Massachusetts in 2012. Furthermore, in
2012 the FBI estimates that there were 243 arrests for rape in Massa-
chusetts,82 meaning that 14.7 percent of reported rapes and 2.9 percent
of estimated actual rapes resulted in an arrest. Based on the NVAWS
estimate that 46.2 percent of rapes that were prosecuted ended in
conviction,83 approximately 6.8 percent of reported and 1.3 percent of
overall rapes resulted in a conviction in Massachusetts in 2012.84
Historically, Massachusetts has had a rate of reported rapes
lower than the national average.85 For instance in 1960, Massachusetts
had a reported rape rate of 4.8 per 100,000 population.86 In that same
year, the United States had a reported rape rate of 9.6 per 100,000
population,87 double that of Massachusetts. Fifteen years later in 1975,
77. Massachusetts Crime Rates, supra note 76.
78. MASSACHUSETTS RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.A.
79. See supra notes 73–75, showing that between 50 and 90 percent of rapes go un-
reported according to different organizations’ estimates.
80. DEAN G. KILPATRICK & KENNETH J. RUGGIERO, RAPE IN MASSACHUSETTS: A REPORT
TO THE COMMONWEALTH 1 (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.musc.edu/ncvc/grants
/50_states_reports/massachusettes.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HR2U-XPBC (“After
reviewing several national sources of information about rape, we determined that the
most methodologically sound information comes from the National Women’s Study (NWS)
and the National Violence Against Women Survey (NVAWS).”).
81. NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 33 (estimating that 80 percent of rapes in America
go unreported). Due to the estimates in the well-respected NIJ report, this Note will pro-
ceed under the assumption that approximately one fifth of actual rapes are reported,
and thus the number of actual rapes is roughly equal to five times the number of re-
ported rapes.
82. Arrests by State 2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, available at http://www
.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/69table
datadecpdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7E3P-555P.
83. NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 33.
84. Id.; Massachusetts Crime Rates, supra note 76. Since there is no available data on
how many rape arrests led to prosecution, this Note will make the (perhaps naïve) as-
sumption that all rape arrests led to prosecution. The NIJ report estimates that 46.2
percent of rapes that were prosecuted end in conviction. Based on the estimated 243 rape
arrests that occurred in Massachusetts, there were approximately 112 convictions for
rape in Massachusetts in 2012. This number is equal to 6.8 percent of the number of re-
ported rapes (1,650), and 1.3 percent of the number of estimated actual rapes (8,250).
85. See MASSACHUSETTS RAPE STATISTIC TABLE, supra Part III.A.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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in the height of the rape reform era, Massachusetts had a reported
rape rate of 19.2 per 100,000 population,88 as compared to a national
rate of 26.3 per 100,000 population.89 Over those fifteen years, the re-
ported rape rate in Massachusetts had quadrupled, and it had moved
from 50 percent to 73 percent of the nationally reported rape rate.90
Fifteen more years later, in 1990, the reported rape rate in Massa-
chusetts was 33.7 per 100,000 population,91 while the reported national
rape rate was 41.2 per 100,000.92 In that period, the reported rape
rate in Massachusetts was 75 percent higher than it had been fifteen
years previous, and had risen to about 81 percent of the national
reported rape rate. Finally, in 2012, Massachusetts had a reported
rape rate of 24.8 per 100,000 population,93 as compared to a national
reported rape rate of 26.9 per 100,000.94 In that twenty-two-year time
period, the reported rape rate had fallen by 26.7 percent but had
risen to be about 92 percent of the national reported rape rate.95 Al-
though the reported rape rate in Massachusetts fluctuated in line with
national trends, it tended to rise steadily in proportion to the national
reported rape rate between 1960 and 2012.96
B. Colorado Rape Statistics
A chart and a graph have been attached below to better illus-
trate the statistics that are referenced in this section.
COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE97
Year
CO Total
Reported
Rapes
CO Rape Report
Rate (per 100,000
population)
USA Total
Reported
Rapes
USA Rape
Report Rate
(per 100,000
population)
1960 229 13.1 17190 9.6
1961 230 12.9 17220 9.4
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. MASSACHUSETTS RAPE STATISTIC TABLE, supra Part III.A.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Information for this table and the graph below comes from Colorado Crime Rates
1960–2012, DISASTER CTR. (Nov. 24, 2013 10:55 AM), http://www.disastercenter.com
/crime/cocrime.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/YP4S-39U3, and from United States Crime
Rates, supra note 76.
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Year
CO Total
Reported
Rapes
CO Rape Report
Rate (per 100,000
population)
USA Total
Reported
Rapes
USA Rape
Report Rate
(per 100,000
population)
1962 283 14.8 17550 9.4
1963 285 14.5 17650 9.4
1964 336 17.1 21420 11.2
1965 318 16.2 23410 12.1
1966 343 17.3 25820 13.2
1967 412 20.9 27620 14
1968 535 26.1 31670 15.9
1969 605 28.8 37170 18.5
1970 795 36 37990 18.7
1971 877 38.4 42260 20.5
1972 905 38.4 46850 22.5
1973 944 38.7 51400 24.5
1974 910 36.5 55400 26.2
1975 1051 41.5 56090 26.3
1976 873 33.8 57080 26.6
1977 1100 42 63500 29.4
1978 1323 49.6 67610 31
1979 1472 53.1 76390 34.7
1980 1510 52.5 82990 36.8
1981 1352 45.6 82500 36
1982 1356 44.5 78770 34
1983 1316 41.9 78920 33.7
1984 1238 39 84230 35.7
1985 1321 40.9 88670 37.1
1986 1382 42.3 91459 38.1
1987 1344 40.8 91110 37.4
1988 1269 38.6 92490 37.6
1989 1202 36.2 94500 38.1
1990 1521 46.2 102560 41.2
1991 1588 47 106590 42.3
1992 1641 47.3 109060 42.8
1993 1633 45.8 106010 41.1
1994 1579 43.2 102220 39.3
1995 1480 39.5 97470 37.1
1996 1765 46.2 96250 36.3
1997 1677 43.1 96153 35.9
1998 1883 47.4 93103 34.4
1999 1679 41.4 89411 32.8
2000 1774 41.2 90178 32
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Year
CO Total
Reported
Rapes
CO Rape Report
Rate (per 100,000
population)
USA Total
Reported
Rapes
USA Rape
Report Rate
(per 100,000
population)
2001 1930 43.6 90863 31.8
2002 2066 45.9 95235 33.1
2003 1913 42.1 93883 32.3
2004 1945 42.3 95089 32.4
2005 2026 43.4 94347 31.8
2006 2076 43.7 92757 30.9
2007 1998 41.1 90428 30
2008 2094 42.4 90479 29.8
2009 2269 45.2 89241 29.1
2010 2230 44.2 85593 27.7
2011 2285 44.7 84175 27
2012 2122 40.9 85141 26.9
In 2012, Colorado had a population of 5,189,458.98 During that
time, approximately 2,122 rapes were reported to police, comprising
a reported rape rate of 40.9 rapes per 100,000 population.99 According
to the NVAWS estimated reporting standard, roughly 20 percent,100
98. Colorado Crime Rates, supra note 97.
99. Id.
100. NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 133.
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the approximate number of actual rapes that occurred in Colorado
in 2012 was 10,610.101 Furthermore, in 2012 the FBI estimates that
there were 333 arrests for rape in Colorado,102 meaning that 15.7
percent of reported rapes and 3.1 percent of estimated actual rapes
resulted in an arrest.103 Based on the NVAWS estimate that 46.2 per-
cent of rapes that were prosecuted ended in conviction,104 approxi-
mately 7.3 percent of reported and 1.5 percent of overall rapes resulted
in a conviction in Colorado in 2012.105
Historically, Colorado has almost always had a rate of reported
rapes rate higher than the national average.106 For instance in 1960,
Colorado had a reported rape rate of 13.1 per 100,000 population.107 In
that same year, the United States had a reported rape rate of 9.6
per 100,000 population.108 Colorado had a reported rape rate 1.36
times that of the nationally reported rape rate.109 Fifteen years later
in 1975, in the height of the rape reform era, Colorado had a reported
rape rate of 41.5 per 100,000 population,110 as compared to a national
rate of 26.3 per 100,000 population.111 Over those fifteen years, the re-
ported rape rate in Colorado had more than tripled, and it had moved
from 1.36 times the national rate to 1.58 times of the nationally re-
ported rape rate.112
Fourteen more years later, in 1989, the reported rape rate in Colo-
rado was 36.2 per 100,000 population,113 while the reported national
rape rate was 38.1 per 100,000.114 In that period, the reported rape
rate in Colorado was 13 percent lower than it had been fourteen years
previous, and for the only time between 1960 and 2012 had fallen
below the nationally reported rape rate, to 95 percent of the national
rate.115 Finally, in 2012, Colorado had a reported rape rate of 40.9 per
101. See COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.B; see also supra note 81.
102. Arrests by State 2012, supra note 82.
103. Id.
104. NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 33.
105. Arrests by State 2012, supra note 82. The NIJ report estimates that 46.2 percent
of rapes that were prosecuted end in conviction. Based on the estimated 333 rape arrests
that occurred in Colorado, there were approximately 154 convictions for rape in Colorado
in 2012. This number is equal to 7.3 percent of the number of reported rapes (2,122),
and 1.5 percent of the number of estimated actual rapes (10,610).
106. COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.B.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. This figure calculated by the author.
113. COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.B.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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100,000 population,116 as compared to a national reported rape rate
of 26.9 per 100,000.117 In that twenty-three-year time period, the
reported rape rate had risen by 12.4 percent and had risen to be
1.51 times the national reported rape rate.118 The reported rape rate
in Colorado was almost always higher than that of the United States
as a whole.119 However, it mostly fluctuated in line with national
trends.120 Colorado’s rape rate hit its nadir as compared to the na-
tional reported rape rate in 1989,121 and has been on the incline in
recent years.122
C. Comparison of Massachusetts and Colorado Rape Statistics
Two graphs have been attached below to better illustrate the
statistics that are referenced in this section.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.B.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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There are a few pronounced differences in the rape statistics of
Massachusetts and Colorado. Most obviously, Colorado consistently
had a higher reported rape rate. In 1960, Colorado’s rape rate was
almost three times that of Massachusetts.123 From that point forward,
the two rape rates began to converge somewhat, but reported rape
rates in Colorado always outstripped those in Massachusetts, and usu-
ally by a fairly large margin. For instance, in 1975, Colorado’s rape
reporting rate was still more than double that of Massachusetts.124
In 1989, the year that the two states’ rape rates were closest in value,
Colorado’s rape reporting rate was 114 percent of Massachusetts’s
rape rate.125 However, by 2012 that figure had climbed back up to 165
percent.126 At all points, Colorado had a higher reported rape rate, al-
though there was some fluctuation in the ratio between the two, espe-
cially in the late 1980s and early 1990s.127
The two jurisdictions’ rape rates also differed in their relationship
to the national average. Between 1960 and 2012, Massachusetts had
a rape rate that was always lower than the national average, but was
also fairly consistently rising in comparison to the national average.128
123. Massachusetts Crime Rates, supra note 76; Colorado Crime Rates, supra note 97.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See MASSACHUSETTS RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.A.
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Massachusetts’s rape rate was 50 percent of the national average in
1960 and rose to 92 percent of the national average in 2012, and rose
fairly steadily in the interim.129 On the other hand, Colorado’s rape
rate fluctuated more intensely in relation to the national average. It
reached a peak of 193 percent of the national rate in 1970, then dipped
below the national average to 95 percent in 1989.130 Colorado’s rate
has been rising in relation to the national rate ever since, to the point
where it reached 152 percent in 2012.131
While the rape rates in Massachusetts and Colorado had some
significant differences, there were also some similarities. The rape
rates in both jurisdictions seemed to fluctuate more or less in line with
national trends.132 Both jurisdictions saw their rape rates increase
fairly steadily between 1960 and the early 1990s, and both saw their
rape rates taper off a bit between the early 1990s and 2012.133 Colo-
rado’s rape rate was a bit more volatile from year to year and had
more peaks and valleys, whereas Massachusetts’s changing rape rates
happened more incrementally. However, each followed the national
pattern to varying degrees.
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Significance of Differences in Massachusetts’s and
Colorado’s Statistics
In analyzing whether the construction of the rape statutes in Mas-
sachusetts and Colorado has made an empirical difference, there are
several factors that must be taken into account. First, and most obvi-
ously, is the fact that Colorado consistently had a higher reported rape
rate than Massachusetts, both in the most recent year in which statis-
tics were gathered, 2012, and every year since 1960. At first blush,
this seems significant. If such a correlation were caused by the dif-
ference in rape statutes across the two jurisdictions, this Note would
be free to speculate as to the explanation behind the higher rape rate
in Colorado, the state without the force requirement. However, the
analysis is not so simple. Causation cannot be implied merely on the
basis of observed correlation.134 Correlations are frequently “spurious,”
129. Id.
130. See COLORADO RAPE STATISTICS TABLE, supra Part III.B.
131. Id.
132. See supra Parts III.A–B.
133. See discussion, supra Parts III.A–B.
134. John Aldrich, Correlations Genuine and Spurious in Pearson and Yule, 10 STAT.
SCI. 364, 365–66 (1995).
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meaning that they occur not due to the cause at issue in the study,
but instead due to outside factors or “common causes.”135
In this case, it seems that the correlation between Colorado, the
state without the force requirement in its statute, and the higher rape
reporting rate is spurious. Colorado had a significantly higher rape
reporting rate than Massachusetts in the 1960s, before the rape reform
era and before Colorado changed its rape statutes to excise the force
requirement.136 That means it is likely that the difference in observed
rape rates, at least in terms of Colorado consistently having a higher
rape rate than Massachusetts, is likely due to jurisdictional differ-
ences rather than the presence or lack of a force requirement. Colo-
rado, for whatever reason, is a jurisdiction that tends to have a higher
reported rape rate.
While the mere fact of Colorado’s higher rape rate is almost cer-
tainly a spurious correlation, this does not mean that there cannot be
genuine correlations between some of the empirical data in this Note
and the force requirement. Every statistical relationship is unique,
and each has a “specific causal structure” which can be used to evalu-
ate if a correlation is genuinely associated with a particular cause.137
Here, it seems that the fluctuation of the ratio of Massachusetts’s rape
reporting rate to Colorado’s rape rate may have been caused, at least
in part, by the statutory differences in the two jurisdictions. The
chart above, entitled “Ratio of MA Rape Rate to CO Rape Rate”138
shows that in the mid-1970s, around the time rape statutes in the
United States began to be reformed, the ratio of Massachusetts’s rape
rate to Colorado’s rape rate was hovering around 50 percent.139 By the
late 1980s and early 1990s, that ratio had ballooned to nearly 90 per-
cent.140 From that point, the ratio fell and has settled around 60 per-
cent for the past few years.141
Based on that fairly extreme fluctuation in ratio, it seems likely
that something of statistical significance happened between the mid-
1970s and the late 1980s, and then between the early 1990s and pres-
ent day. “Significance is a statistical term that tells how sure you
are that a difference or relationship exists.”142 While statistical sig-
nificance can be affirmatively calculated through a number of different
135. Id. at 366.
136. Massachusetts Crime Rates, supra note 76; Colorado Crime Rates, supra note 97.
137. Aldrich, supra note 134, at 374.
138. See Chart, Ratio of MA Rape Rate to CO Rape Rate, supra Part III.C.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Statistical Significance, STATPAC, http://www.statpac.com/surveys/statistical
-significance.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/7CBV-D788.
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mathematical avenues,143 such calculations are beyond the scope of
this Note. Fortunately, such calculations are not necessary here. The
amount of the fluctuation in ratio between Colorado’s rape reporting
rate and Massachusetts’s rape reporting rate—from 50 percent to 90
percent and back to 60 percent—is very strong evidence that some-
thing measurable, some “difference or relationship” existed. This fluc-
tuation happened over a number of years and involved a large number
of data points.
Other factors seem to further suggest that the fluctuations be-
tween the mid-1970s and 2012 were significant. The above graph
entitled “Ratio of MA Rape Rate to National Rape Rate”144 shows that
Massachusetts’s rape rate was consistently climbing in comparison
to the national rape rate, from before the rape reform era, through the
height of rape reform and into the present day. However, a starkly
contrasting picture is painted by Colorado data. In the above graph
entitled “Ratio of CO Rape Rate to National Rape Rate,”145 Colorado’s
rape reporting rate is shown to be at around 160 percent of the na-
tional reporting rate in the mid-1970s, the beginning of the rape
reform era.146 Colorado’s reporting rate then drops precipitously to
just below the national reporting rate in the late 1980s, and eventually
rises back up to be around 160 percent of the national rate in the
present day.147 This set of data confirms that something of statistical
significance happened in Colorado’s rape reporting rates (and thus in
the empirical difference between the rape reporting rates of Massa-
chusetts and Colorado) between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s
and then again between the early 1990s and 2012.
B. Theoretical Explanations for Statistical Differences
As the data make clear, there are two distinct periods in which
Colorado’s rape reporting rate had significant trends in comparison
to Massachusetts’s rape reporting rate and the national norm. In the
period between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, Colorado’s rape re-
porting rate fell relative to both the national average and Massachu-
setts’s rape reporting rate.148 Then, between 1990 and 2012, Colorado’s
rape arrest rate rose relative to both Massachusetts and the national
average, and by 2012 it was essentially in the same position relative
to Massachusetts and the nation that it had been in the mid-1970s.149
143. Id.
144. See supra Part III.A.
145. See id.
146. See supra Part III.B.
147. See id.
148. See Historical Rape Rates Table, supra Part III.C.
149. See id.
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These fluctuations beg two questions: first, did the difference in rape
statutes contribute to the trends in question? And if so, what effects
on rape jurisprudence were effected by the different statutes?
The first question, whether Colorado and Massachusetts’s differ-
ing statutes contributed to the trends in question, is difficult to an-
swer. Colorado and Massachusetts clearly have different approaches
to rape. This can be gleaned by analyzing their rape statutes, but
also by the number of rapes reported in each state between 1960 and
2012. Colorado always had a higher rape reporting rate than Massa-
chusetts and frequently had a much higher rape reporting rate than
the national average.150 Clearly, each jurisdiction has a different ap-
proach to rape cases and differing expectations to how many rapes
are traditionally reported. It is very difficult to tell whether the statu-
tory differences at issue in this Note affected the trends observed.
Many explanations for the observed trends that do not implicate
statutory construction are present. For instance, perhaps in the
period between 1975 and 1989, Colorado was inundated with police de-
partments and municipal personnel who wanted to make Colorado
seem like a nice place to live by skewing the rape statistics downward.
Then, perhaps those personnel were replaced in the early 1990s and
the numbers gradually returned to the actual level over time once
the numbers were no longer being skewed. This scenario is possible
but unlikely, as it is difficult to misreport reporting rates, and the
numbers gradually increased and decreased relative to the national
average, rather than the rapid change one might expect when dishon-
est officials are replaced by honest ones.
Alternatively, the national average rape reporting rate was at
its highest point in the past 50 years during the late 1980s and early
1990s.151 Perhaps Colorado can be expected to follow the national
trends up to a certain point, but once the national trend gets too high,
the already high Colorado rape reporting rate has no further room to
rise. This explanation, while more plausible than the dishonest official
explanation above, is still lacking. Colorado’s rape reporting rate in
1989 was at its lowest in the post-rape reform era, which coincided
with the national average and Massachusetts nearing their highest
ever rates.152 Meanwhile, both the national and Massachusetts rape
reporting rates fell consistently between the early 1990s and present
day, whereas Colorado’s rate has fluctuated somewhat, but remained
fairly constant since the mid-1990s.153
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
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Based on the timing of the fluctuations it seems more likely that
the rape reporting rates of Colorado, Massachusetts, and the nation
were affected by the rape reform era as a whole and specifically by the
different statutory construction. As explained above,154 the rape reform
era began in the mid-1970s and captured the nation’s attention for the
next two decades. Rape reform began with some pioneer states chang-
ing their laws in the mid-1970s,155 continued with the widespread re-
peal of resistance and corroboration requirements in the 1980s,156 and
the redefinition of the force requirement in some states in the early
1990s.157 However, the rape reform movement became much less active
after the early 1990s, and it became less entrenched in the national
psyche.158 Perhaps Colorado’s force-less rape statute in conjunction
with its naturally higher rape reporting rate placed its rape report-
ing rate in the zone that the rape reform movement aspired to place
the national rape rate, and kept it in that zone while the national rate
tapered off after rape reform was no longer a hot news topic.
There are compelling reasons to believe the removal of the force
requirement from Colorado’s sexual assault statute may have affected
its rape reporting rate and its fluctuation from the rates of Massachu-
setts and the United States. However, it is impossible to prove without
better statistics about actual rapes, arrest rates through the decades,
conviction rates, and a comparison with the rape rates of other juris-
dictions without force requirements that is outside the scope of this
Note. This Note therefore cannot definitively show that the difference
in rape statutes contributed to the observed statistical trends.
If one nonetheless assumes that Colorado’s removal of the force
requirement from its rape statute affected its rape reporting rate, the
question becomes how did it do so? Two distinct theories are plausi-
ble. The first is that Colorado’s removal of a force requirement from
its rape statute led to fewer rape reports as compared to its proportion
to the national average between the period of 1975 and 1989. Then,
the effect it had wore off in the early 1990s and Colorado’s rape report-
ing rate gradually increased proportional to the national average, until
it had reached the same general ratio it had been when the statute
was first reformed in the mid-1970s.
This theory leans heavily on the fact that the national rape report-
ing rate (and Massachusetts’s rape reporting rate) rose between the
154. See discussion, supra Part I.
155. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 2, at 559.
156. Futter & Mebane, supra note 28, at 72–73; Horney & Spohn, supra note 3, at
118–19.
157. Rape Law, supra note 34, at 970.
158. Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1369–71 (2013).
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mid-1970s and the early 1990s and then fell consistently from the mid-
1990s through present day, while Colorado’s rape reporting rate did
not follow that general trend.159 Instead, Colorado’s rape reporting
rate fell somewhat between the time of its removal of the force require-
ment from its rape statute and the late 1980s, but seemed to gener-
ally fluctuate within a constant range between 1975 and present
day.160 This theory suggests that Colorado would have followed the
national curve, but for its removal of the force requirement from its
rape statute, which depressed Colorado’s rape reporting rate for a
period of time before gradually losing effect.
This theory is implausible for several reasons. First, while Colo-
rado’s rape reporting rate did not remain constant between 1985 and
2012, it fluctuated within a fairly constricted set of values, with no
apparent trend upward or downward over time.161 Therefore, Colo-
rado’s rape reporting rate remained relatively constant. A mostly
stable variable, such as Colorado’s rape reporting rate, seems a curious
tool to use to prove that Colorado’s statutory language created a pro-
found effect between 1985 and 1989, and then lost effect between
1989 and 2012. The constancy of the rate seems to defy that particular
explanation. Further, it seems unlikely that the overall effect of remov-
ing the force statute would be to lower the rape reporting rate. After
all, it is a tool that theoretically makes convictions easier to achieve.
One could argue that perhaps removing the force requirement had
such a profound effect that it significantly lowered the actual rape
rate, and the reporting rate fell accordingly. This seems highly un-
likely, and is not supported by the fact that Colorado’s rape report-
ing rate, while falling somewhat in the first few years after the force
requirement was removed from its rape statute, remained relatively
constant over time. It seems more likely that falling reporting rates in-
dicate less justice for rape victims, and that it is unlikely that Colorado
toughening its rape laws would lead to such an outcome.
The second theory for how Colorado’s removal of its force require-
ment empirically affected its rape reporting rate is based in the idea
that removing the force requirement kept—and keeps—rape reform
and justice for rape victims in the forefront of the civic conversation
in the state of Colorado. This theory suggests that Colorado was
always a state that was sensitive to rape victims’ rights as under-
scored by its rape reporting rate that was consistently higher than
the national average. Under this theory, Colorado was a state whose
159. Historical Rape Rates Table, supra Part III.C.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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residents reached a level of rape awareness before citizens of other
states had fully been exposed to the rape reform movement.
During the period between 1975 and 1989, during which the rape
reform movement was in full swing, the level of rape awareness in the
country was heightened to such a degree that the national average
rape reporting rate rose consistently and even briefly eclipsed Colo-
rado’s rape reporting rate.162 Then, from the mid-1990s until present
day when the rape reform era was on the wane and the level of aware-
ness dipped, the national average rape rate fell back to a level near
what it had been at the beginning of the rape reform era. There was no
corresponding dip in Colorado, because Colorado’s removal of the force
requirement served as an emblem of Colorado’s commitment to rape
victims’ rights. Colorado’s statutory changes kept the concept of justice
for rape victims in the forefront of the thoughts of judges, police, and
state employees.
This theory is much more plausible than the first theory. Firstly,
it fits the statistical findings better than the first theory. Instead of
using a convoluted explanation of how a rate remaining relatively con-
stant was actually akin to that rate falling, it accounts for Colorado’s
relatively steady rape reporting rate and the national and Massa-
chusetts rape reporting rates rising between the mid-1970s and early
1990s and falling thereafter. Furthermore, this theory is based in the
idea of statutory language being symbolic. Many scholars believe that
in rape cases, the actual wording of statutes is relatively unimportant,
because juries will tend to judge rape cases based largely on the so-
cietal morals of the day.163
While at first blush this appears to cut against any implication
that statutory changes such as removing a force requirement could
have a statistical effect on rape reporting rates, it in fact implies the
opposite. It shows that the changing of statutory changes in rape cases
is often symbolic, but such symbols help to develop and define the so-
cietal morals upon which grounds jurors will decide the outcome of
rape cases. It may even be that a sense of jurors’ heightened sense of
sympathy towards victims of rape encourages victims to report these
crimes. The data that could further support this theory is sorely lack-
ing. Actual rape rates and accurate conviction rates would be neces-
sary in further evaluating this theory, and such data is unavailable to
the public, and possibly to anyone. However, based on reporting rate
data, this is a theory that makes sense and accounts for the statistical
findings of this Note.
162. See id.
163. Bryden, supra note 7, at 320, 476–77.
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CONCLUSION
Rape statutes and jurisprudence have been in a state of flux in the
United States since the rape reform era starting in the 1970s. Some
jurisdictions, such as Massachusetts have maintained the traditional
requirement that a rapist must use or threaten to use physical force
during the rape in order to face potential criminal liability.164 In con-
trast, other jurisdictions such as Colorado have completely removed
the force requirement, and categorize all nonconsensual sexual inter-
course as rape.165
This Note compiled rape reporting rate statistics from Massachu-
setts, Colorado, and the United States from the time period between
1960 and 2012. Colorado consistently had a higher rape reporting rate
than Massachusetts, and it had a higher rape reporting rate than the
United States for every year observed except 1989.166 While Colorado’s
rape rate fluctuated a bit in either direction, it remained relatively
constant during the period between the mid-1970s and 2012.167 Both
Massachusetts and the United States had rape reporting rates that
rose consistently between the mid-1970s and early 1990s (the height
of the rape reform era) and then fell consistently between the early
1990s and 2012.168
This Note was unable to decisively determine that the differences
in the rape reporting rates of Colorado and Massachusetts or even the
fluctuation in their ratio to one another was related to their differing
rape statutes. There simply was not enough germane data to fully
support that conclusion. Actual rape rates have been the subject of
controversy for years, and have notoriously been inaccurately esti-
mated.169 Furthermore, accurate conviction data is unavailable for
public consumption.170 Without this data, the formulation of a defensi-
ble causation hypothesis is impossible. If effective empirical research
is to be done in the future, better, more accurate data collection meth-
ods regarding rape cases need to be employed and made available
to the academic community.
164. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265 § 22 (West 2014).
165. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-402 (West 2013).
166. Massachusetts Crime Rates, supra note 76; Colorado Crime Rates, supra note
97; United States Crime Rates, supra note 76.
167. See Colorado Crime Rates, supra note 97.
168. See Historical Rape Rates Table, supra Part III.C.
169. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The Truth About a Viral Graphic on Rape Statistics, WASH.
POST (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/2014/12/09
/the-truth-about-a-viral-graphic-on-rape-statistics/, archived at http://perma.cc/Q43P
-FKQ8.
170. See NIJ Report, supra note 64, at 33.
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This Note advanced two theories of how the statutory differences
between Massachusetts and Colorado may have affected the statistics.
Based on the data, the most likely theory for how the rape reporting
rates were affected by the statutory differences (if they were so af-
fected) was based largely upon symbolism. Scholars have contended
that rape juries often disregard the letter of the law and base their ver-
dicts on their own senses of morality. Colorado’s removal of the force
requirement was a symbolic gesture that helped to shape public moral-
ity, and thus potentially kept Colorado’s rape reporting rate consis-
tently high whereas Massachusetts’s rate rose and fell in sync with the
prevalence of the rape reform movement in the national consciousness.
Regardless of statistical impact, Colorado’s removal of the force
requirement from its rape statute is laudable, because it is a power-
ful symbolic gesture with the potential to have an empirical impact.
This Note was unable to definitively find a link between removal of
the force requirement and shifts in the rape reporting rates of Massa-
chusetts and Colorado. However, it advances the philosophy that jus-
tice in rape cases is an important goal for the United States, and all
measures taken to further this goal, such as Colorado’s abolishment
of the force requirement, should be viewed as positive.
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